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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure to consider this appeal from the order of the 
First Judicial District Court for Box Elder County, granting the 
motion of Plaintiffs for summary judgment against Defendants. 
Ill STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issues presented by this appeal are: 
(1) Whether the lower court erred in entering summary 
judgment against Defendants. The standard of review is whether 
or not there was a genuine issue of material fact upon which 
these issues could properly be submitted to a trier of fact. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c); Webber v. Sill, 675 P.2d 
1170 (Utah 1983). 
(2) Whether or not the Appellants appeal is frivolous or 
made for purposes of delay so as to subject to the Appellant to 
damages under the provisions of Rule 33 Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. That standard of review for this determination is 
whether the appeal was not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, 
modify, or reverse existing law. 
IV. DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-
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501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (Amended 1990) 
are critical to this appeal. Rule 56(c) provides in pertinent 
part: 
(c)...The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleading, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law... 
(e)...When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported [by affidavit] as provided in this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment,, if appropriate,shall be entered 
against him. 
Rule 4-501(5) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
provides in part: 
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to 
which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each 
disputed fact shall be stateid in separate numbered 
sentences and shall refer with particularity to those 
portions of the record upon which the opposing party 
relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered 
sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are 
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement shall be deemed admitted for the propose of 
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the opposing parties' statement. 
The statute which is determinative of one of the primary issues 
raised in this appeal is Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-13; which is 
reproduced as an exhibit in Appendix A. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS RELEVANT TO APPEAL 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are those set forth in 
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the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Since Defendants did 
not specifically controvert any of those facts in opposition to 
Plaintiffs motion, this Court must take those facts as 
established under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Those facts, as set forth in the record below, as well as 
relevant procedural facts, are as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Shopko Stores Inc. (hereinafter referred to 
as "SHOPKO"), purchased the subject property, upon which the 
Defendants' sign is located, from the Co-Plaintiff, Lily Pond 
Associates (hereinafter "Lily Pond"), on or about August 9, 1989. 
2. Lily Pond purchased the property from the Brigham City 
Redevelopment Agency, a governmental agency, on or about June 5, 
1987. 
3. Brigham city Redevelopment Agency acquired the property 
by Warranty Deed for Brigham City Corporation, a municipal 
corporation, on or about July 18, 1985. 
4. Brigham City Corporation acquired the property from the 
United States of America, Department of Interior, by deeds dated 
May 11, 1977; March 29, 1983; and January 22, 1985. 
5. The United States of America acquired the property for 
the purpose of establishing a Veteran's Hospital in September 
1942. 
6. Therefore, the property was continuous ownership by 
governmental entities from September, 1942 to June, 1987, a 
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period of approximately 45 years. 
7. The property was in private ownership, in the name of 
the Plaintiffs, for a period of only 2 6 months prior to the 
filing of Plaintiffs1 Complaint. 
8. Plaintiffs have desired to develop the property for 
commercial purposes and have commenced construction of a shopping 
center on the property. 
9. The Defendants are the purported owners of a sign 
advertising the Bushnell Motel. That sign is located on a 
portion of the above-described property. 
10. The sign was located on the portion of Plaintiffs1 
property which is adjacent to the Main Street in Brigham City, is 
within an existing 20 foot utility easement, and the sign has 
overhung the public sidewalk, contrary to local ordinances. 
11. A search of the records at the Box Elder County 
Recorder's Office establishes that there has never been an 
instrument recorded establishing a legal interest, in favor of 
Defendants, in the property upon which the sign is located. 
12. Plaintiffs1 counsel, by letter dated May 18, 1989, made 
demand on Defendants that they remove the sign from the premises. 
13. Defendants, through their attorney, advised Plaintiffs 
that it claimed an interest in the property and refused to move 
the sign. Defendants claimed they have either a valid 
"prescriptive easement", "appurtenant easement", and/or "easement 
by implication". 
14. According to the information provided by Defendants, 
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the sign has been located on the property for forty years. 
(Defendants1 Answer to Interrogatory No. 8). Defendants 
purchased the motel,together with any interest in the sign, in 
1967. 
Even though the facts recited above are conclusively 
established by Defendants failure to controvert them below, 
Defendants attempt to introduce new alleged facts and inferences 
in their brief on appeal. This attempt to introduce new 
allegations does not create a genuine issue of material facts; 
accordingly, the Court should not even consider those alleged 
facts. Nevertheless, Plaintiff disputes the following alleged 
facts contained in Appellants statement of the case with 
appropriate citations to the record as to the true facts: 
1. Contrary to Defendants assertion, agreement for sale 
between Defendant and his predecessor in interest, did not 
warrant the property on which the sign was located. Paragraph 7 
of exhibit lfBM attached to Defendants1 exhibit MAM in response to 
Plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents clearly 
shows that the seller warranted title to the sign but merely 
quit-claimed whatever interest they may have had in the property 
upon which the sign was located. (See Exhibit B) The specific 
language used by sellers should have placed the Defendants on 
notice they had no real interest in the property upon which the 
sign was located. 
2. Contrary to Defendants assertion, Plaintiffs did not 
purchase the property from Brigham City Redevelopment Agency 
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subject to any appurtenances or encroachments existing thereon, 
as evidenced by the Warranty Deed dated June 8, 1987, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
VI, SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendants brief is an impermissible attempt to reargue the 
motion lost below based upon new factual allegations unsupported 
by the record and legal arguments that they failed or chose not 
to raise at any time in the summary judgment proceedings below. 
Since these new factual allegations and legal theories could not 
in any way have formed the basis of the lower Court's decision, 
Defendant improperly attacks that decision as erroneous. The 
uncontroverted facts conclusively established that Plaintiff is 
entitled to» judgment as a matter of law; therefore, the lower 
Court's judgment in favor of Plaintiff must be affirmed. 
Even though Defendant's brief is filled almost entirely with 
new factual allegations and legal arguments that were not 
sufficiently presented below, those arguments still lack merit 
and in no way require reversal of the lower Court's judgment. 
The fundamental flaw in Defendants" arguments is that they fail 
to recognize that there are factuail prerequisites necessary to 
establish a right of easement in another's property and that 
those prerequisites are totally absent in this case. 
Prescriptive easement can only be obtained through adverse 
use and possession of another's property and adverse possession 
could not legally have occurred in this case because the property 
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in question was owned by a governmental entities for a period 
exceeding the life of the sign. 
Further, Defendants claim of appurtenant easement also fails 
because of Defendants failure to establish the factual basis upon 
which this claim could be granted, as a matter of law. 
The lower Court correctly granted Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment since there were no genuine issues of material 
fact. Appellants failed to controvert any of the material facts 
set forth in the memorandum and affidavit Plaintiff submitted to 
the Court below. Since, as a matter of undisputed fact, there 
was absolutely no notice of any easement or any other interest in 
the subject property available through the usual means at the Box 
Elder County Recorder's Office, Defendants' claim of some 
property right must be based upon the existence of facts 
sufficient to give rise to those claims; and the lower Court's 
judgment should be affirmed. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANTS HAD NOT 
ESTABLISHED ANY FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIM 
OR APPURTENANT EASEMENT. 
To establish the existence of an "appurtenant easement" there 
must be both a dominant and a servient estate. The trial Court 
that Defendants' claim of appurtenant easement was not supported 
by the facts presented. The Defendant claims that property upon 
which it's motel is located must be the dominant estate and the 
Plaintiff's property, situated a block distant and upon which 
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Defendants1 sign advertising the motel is located, must be the 
servient estate. There is no evidence and no claim that these 
two parcels were ever part of the same property or under common 
ownership. The time an appurtenant easement is created, the 
grantor must have some interest in the property being affected by 
the easement, otherwise the permission for that use would be a 
trespass and without authorization. An appurtenant easement was 
not granted in this case as there is no record of its being 
granted and there is no factual allegation of its being granted 
by any person in the past. Defendants state that the contract, 
by which Defendants purchased the motel property, established 
some interest in the property now owned by Plaintiffs. This 
allegation is not supported by fact as evidenced by the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract dated February 1, 1967 and produced by the 
Defendants as Exhibit "A" to its response to Plaintiffs1 Request 
for Production of Documents, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit B. The sellers merely granted to Defendants whatever 
interest, if any, "which they may have to the property upon which 
the signs are located." Another requirement for establishing 
appurtenant easement is that the two estates be located adjacent 
to each other. Vanderbilt Law Rcaview (1986 page 111) . This 
element was not established by Defendants since the parcels are, 
in fact, separated by one block distance. Further, appurtenant 
easements have been traditionally imposed for ingress, egress, 
conveyance of water or similar uses, without which the benefitted 
parcel is essentially without value. The thing being benefitted 
8 
in this case is not the property itself, but the business of 
operating a motel upon the property. This is not a sufficient 
basis for an appurtenant easement. Nelson v. Johnson, 679 P. 2d 
662 (Idaho). The mere existence of a billboard sign on another's 
property does not give right to an appurtenant easement, Zinser, 
et al v. Luks, 235 S.W.2d 844. Defendant has merely had the free 
use of someone elses property for forty years. Defendants1 claim 
of appurtenant easement failed, not because a single factual 
element was missing, but because no factual elements were 
established which could support Defendants' theory. 
B. THE TRAIL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANTS HAD 
NOT ESTABLISHED ANY FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS FOR THEIR 
CLAIMS OF PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT OR ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
Defendants appear to claim that by merely alleging an 
easement by prescription, a question of fact arises that must be 
determined by a jury. Defendants beg the critical question, to-
wit: are there questions of fact which, if proven, are 
sufficient to establish elements for a prescriptive easement? 
Defendants fail to accept both established common law and 
statutory mandate that one cannot obtain an interest in the land 
of another by adverse use or possession when the other property 
owner is a governmental entity for governmental purposes. 
Averett v. Utah County Drainage District No. 1, 763 P.2d 428 and 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-13. The property owned by Plaintiff 
had been under governmental ownership for over 45 years at the 
time this action was filed. Defendants have claimed that the 
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sign in question had been in that location for forty years, the 
commencement of which period was five years into the governmental 
ownership period. The property in question has only been in 
private ownership since June, 1987, less than two years prior to 
Plaintiffs1 written notice demanding Defendants remove the sign. 
It is clear that the period for obtaining an easement by 
prescription on public land does begin to run until the land has 
been transferred from public to private ownership. Herbertson v. 
Iliff, 775 P.2d 754 (New Mex 1989). That short period is 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish a prescriptive or 
adverse right to possession or use. Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 
1062 (Utah 1984); Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982). The 
person claiming a prescriptive easement must establish the 
necessary elements by clear and convincing evidence. Marchant v. 
Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989); Garmond v. Kinney, 579 
P.2d 178 (New Mex 1978). Defendants would only have been 
entitled to a jury trial if there had been genuine issues of 
material fact. However, the factual issues were not in dispute, 
although the legal conclusions which could be drawn from the 
undisputed facts, were. Simply put, the Defendants provided no 
factual basis for a claim of prescriptive easement upon which the 
Court could rule in its favor, since a prescriptive easement 
requires adverse possession and adverse possession could not have 
occurred against this property which was owned by governmental 
entities since 1942. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THERE IS NO GENUINE 
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ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT AND PLAINTIFF WAS 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Defendants continue to assert that because some factual 
issues may have been in dispute, the Defendant is necessarily 
entitled to a trial in this case. The criteria is whether or not 
there are issues of material fact. Webber v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 
(Utah 1983). Frankly, Defendants have failed to raise any 
"genuine issues of material fact". 
The United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986), ruled as follows: 
"...the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise 
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the 
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of 
material fact." 
Further, that Court also ruled that 
"...there is no issue for trial unless there is 
sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a 
jury to return a verdict for that party... if the 
evidence is merely tolerable...or is not significantly 
probative...summary judgment may be granted." 
Also, additional language, which is helpful in our case, stated 
that: 
the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in 
support of (the non-moving party's) position will be 
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury 
could reasonably find for (that party)." 
There are no facts provided by Defendants upon which any of 
the alleged legal theories can be sustained. Clearly, the 
undisputed facts establish only that Defendants and their 
predecessors have enjoyed the unauthorized benefit of another's 
property without payment, without a recorded interest, and 
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without any attempt by them to perfect any of their alleged 
easement claims. 
The purpose of summary judgment is well established; to-wit: 
to avoid the time, expense, and burden of a frivolous trial by 
reviewing a case as presented by the parties to determine if a 
genuine issue of fact exists. Webber, at 1172, the United States 
Supreme Court discussed the question of summary judgment criteria 
in great length in Celotex Corp. v. Katrett, 106 S.Ct 2548 
(1986). The Court there ruled as follows: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates 
the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for 
discovery and upon motion, against the party who fails 
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence 
of an essential element to that party's case, and on 
which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine 
issue as to any material fact," since a complete 
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all facts 
immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law" because the non-moving party has 
failed to make a sufficient showing of an essential 
element of (its) case with respect to which (it) has 
the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321. 
Further, the Celotex Court went on to explain that: 
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as 
a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an 
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which 
are designed "to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action." 
The trial judge below obviously applied these standards in 
his determination of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
no authority is given which would lead to a contrary result. 
D. DEFENDANTS APPEAL HEREIN IS FRIVOLOUS AND THE COURT 
SHOULD AWARD TO THE PLAINTIFFS JUST DAMAGES. 
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the 
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Court may assess damages upon a finding that the appeal taken is 
either frivolous or for delay. A frivolous appeal is defined in 
Rule 33(b) as follows: 
"...one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal... 
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed 
for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause 
needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain 
time that will benefit only the party filing the 
appeal..." 
Defendants have been aware from the time counsel received written 
notice to remove the sign from the property in May, 1989, that 
the property was subject to a pending sale for use as a shopping 
center and that the existence of the sign on the property impeded 
that sale. Prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff offered to 
pay for the relocation costs of the sign in addition to payment 
of other sums, as nuisance value to avoid the requirement of 
extended and expensive litigation. Plaintiff's counsel further 
provided Defendants with the same basic authority as was used in 
the motion for summary judgment to establish that Plaintiffs1 
claims were virtually without merit. Those requests were 
ignored, forcing the Plaintiffs to file quiet title action, 
resulting in considerable monetary loss to the Plaintiffs , in 
addition to legal fees and costs incurred in connection with this 
case, to date. 
Plaintiffs assert that, under the circumstances, treble 
costs and reasonable attorney fees should be awarded to the 
Plaintiffs, in addition to affirming the Court's Order for 
Summary Judgment. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons and the file herein, 
including Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the 
decision of the trial Court in granting summary judgment should 
be sustained and Defendant's appeal denied. The trial Court's 
decision was well reasoned and based upon the issues raised and 
factual matters asserted by the parties. The lower Court 
correctly concluded that the Plaintiffs were entitled to quiet 
title in the subject property and that Defendants had no legal 
claim of easement thereto. The facts supporting the lower Courts 
conclusion are uncontroverted, and the law, which Defendants did 
not attack below, is clear. The Court should summarily dismiss 
the arguments and purported factual issues that Defendants seek 
to raise on appeal. Further, those arguments and purported 
issues lack merit and do not change the fact that Plaintiffs were 
and are entitled to quiet title and the Court should affirm in 
all respects the lower Courts judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of November, 1990. 
MERRILL G. HANSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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tract 195i 
78-12-9. What cons t i tu tes adverse possession 
u n d e r wr i t ten ins t rument 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse posses 
sion by any person claiming a title founded upon a 
written instrument or a judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in 
following cases 
(1) where it has been usually cultivated o^im 
proved 
(2) where it has been protected by ayfubstan 
tial inclosure 
(3) where, although not inclosed, 1/ has been 
used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber, 
for the purpose of husbandry, or for pf sturage or 
for the ordinary use of the occupan 
(4) where a known farm or single lbt has been 
partly improved, the portion of such Farm or lot 
that may have been left not clearedlor not in-
closed according to the usual course and custom 
of the adjoining county is deemed to fcave been 
occupied for the same length of time aA the part 
improved and cultivated \ 1953 
78-12-10. Under claim not founded on 
instrument or judgment 
Where it appears that there has been an actual 
continued occupation of land under claim of title, ex-
clusive of any other right, but not founded upon a 
written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so 
actually occupied, and no other, is deemed to have 
been held adversely 1953 
78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession 
not under written instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse posses-
sion by a person claiming title, not founded upon a 
written instrument, judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the 
following cases only 
(1) where it has been protected by a substan-
tial inclosure 
(2) where it has been usually cultivated or im-
proved 
(3) where labor or money has been expended 
upon dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or 
otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such lands 
amounting to the sum of $5 per acre 1953 
78-12-12. Possess ion mus t be con t inuous , and 
t axes paid 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered 
established under the provisions of any section of this 
code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been 
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years 
continuously, and that the partv, his predecessors 
and grantors have paid all taxes which have been 
levied and assessed upon such land according to law 
1953 
78-12-12.1. Possess ion and paymen t of taxes — 
Prov i so — Tax title 
sessed upon such real property after the dehnqupnt 
tax sale or transfer under which he claims for a pe 
nod of not less than foui years and for not less than 
one year after the effective date of this amendment, 
shall be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this 
section in r^Pfrj_,tU tthfiiJHy.lI"!"!; of taxes necessar> to 
estai^prfa'averse possess lori^'"^*******^^^ 1953 
t h e ^ 7 8 - 1 2 - 1 3 Adverse possess ion of publ ic str^ 
or ways . 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or 
title in or to any lands held by any town, city or 
county, or the corporate authorities thereof, desig 
nated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys 
parks or public squares, or for any other public pur-
pose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of 
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear 
that such town or city or county or the corporate au-
thorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, 
and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a 
valuable consideration, and tha t for more than seven 
years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, 
his grantees or successors in interest, have been in 
the exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of 
such real estate, in which case an adverse title may 
be acquired 1953 
-14. Possess ion of tenant deemed 
siou of landlord. " 
When the relation of landlord and tenant has ex-
isted between any persons, the possession of the ten-
ant is deemed the possession of the landlord until the 
expiration of seven years from the termination of the 
tenancy, or, where there has been no written lease, 
until the expiration of seven years from the time of 
the last payment of rent, notwithstanding that such 
tenant may have acquired another title, or may have 
claimed to hold adversely to his landlord, but such 
presumption cannot be made after the periods herein 
l i m i t e d 1953 
78-12-15. Possess ion not affected by descent 
c a s t 
The right of a person to the possession of real prop 
erty is not impaired or affected by a descent cast in 
consequence of the death of a person in possession of 
such property 1953 
78-12-16. Act ion to r e d e e m m o r t g a g e of real 
p r o p e r t y . 
No action to redeem a mortgage (of] real property, 
with or without an account of rents and profits, ma\ 
be brought by the mortgager, or those claiming under 
him, against the mortgagee in possession, or those 
claiming under him unless he or they have continu 
ously maintained |anl adverse possession of the mort 
gaged premises for seven years after breach of some 
condition of the mortgage 1953 
78-12-17. Redempt ion w h e n m o r e t h a n one 
mor tgago r . 
If there is more than one such mortgagor, or more 
than one person claiming under a mortgagor some of 
EXHIBIT B. 
Supplemental provisions of Uniform Real Estate Contract 
of February 1, 1967 between DAVID E. SORENSEN and VERLA A. 
SORENSEN, his wife, sellers, and LYMAN W. HEMMERT, buyer, 
covering sale of Brigham Motel, Brigham City, Utah: 
1. Interest on the unpaid contract balance shall be 
charged at the rate of four and one-half (4%%) percent per 
annum until such time as the existing mortgage with Utah 
Mortgage Loan is paid in full; at such time as said mortgage 
is paid in full, interest on the unpaid contract balance shall 
be increased to six (670) percent per annum. 
2. Sellers shall execute no loans secured by the 
property as provided under paragraph 8 of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract wherein the number of installments exceed the 
number of installments due sellers under this contract. 
3. Buyer agrees to maintain the property in such a 
manner as to comply with all FHA regulations and requirements 
as disclosed by annual FHA inspections. Sellers represent 
that all existing FHA requirements have been met, with the 
exception of exterior painting of the interior court which 
must be done as soon as weather permits; said painting to be 
done by buyer. 
4. In the event buyer defaults in this agreement, 
buyer agrees and by this agreement does hereby transfer and 
assign to sellers as additional security for said agreement, 
all future rents and rentals from the property to the extent 
necessary to bring the contract current, and consents that 
sellers may enter upon the premises and collect said rents 
and rentals and apply the same against any outstanding bal-
ances which may be due and owing. The exercise of this remedy 
shall not affect sellers1 right to an election of remedies as 
provided in the Uniform Real Estate Contract herein. 
5. Buyer agrees to maintain the inventory of personal 
property in the same or greater quantities as said inventory 
exists as of the contract date. 
6. All rents, taxes, insurance and reserves shall be 
pro-rated between the parties as of February 1, 1967, and an 
appropriate credit or debit, as the case may be, shall be made 
against the contract balance. 
V 
7. All existing signs are included in this sale, and 
sellers warrant title to said signs, including the sign lo-
cated on the corner one-half block west of the property and / 
LAW OFFICES 
Thomas, Armstrong, HuwlUigb & We&t 
1300 WALKER BANK BUILDING 
•ALT LAKf CITY 
u 
the sign located at Perry, Utah. Sellers quit-claim to buyer 
all right, title and interest which they may have to the property 
upon which the signs are located. Sellers represent that the 
Perry sign is located upon leased premises presently at the rate 
of $25.00 per month; sign rental to be pro-rated between the 
parties as of the date of this contract. 
id 
/ / 
Sellers 
Buyer 
< ^ -
LAW urnccs 
Thomas. Armstrong, R*vllngi & Went 
I S O O WALKER BANK B U I L D I N G 
• A L T LAKK CITY 
HILLAM AGENCY 
Mail Tax Notice: LILLY POND ASSOCIATES, 60 East 42nd Street, New York, New York 10022 
c/o William Lubliner 
WARRANTY DEED 
BRIGHAM CITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY 
of Brighan City County of Box Elder 
CONVEY andWARRANT to 
grantor 
State of Utah, hereby 
LILLY POND ASSOCIATES, a Delaware general partnership 
grantee 
of County , State of Utah 
for the sum of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 - - ($ 1,500,000.00POLLARS 
the following described tract of land in g ^ Ei<jer County, 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
(See attached Exhibit A, Property Description) 
Subject to the terns and conditions of the AGREEMENT FDR DISPOSITION OF LAND. 
Dated June &** 1987, which is recorded concurrently herewith. 
WITNESS the hand of aaid grantor , this 
Signed in the presence of 
A. D. 1987 
Brigham City Redevelopment Agency 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER ss. 
On the % day of June A. D. 19 8 7 personally 
appeared before me PETER C. KNUDSON, Chairman of the Brigham 
City Redevelopment Agency 
the signer of the within instrument who doly acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same.
 t and was SJO authorized. 
My Commission Expires: 
\bAQO 
-Residing at Je^iL^L 
M ^ •• 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the BRIEF OF APPELLEE, to Dale M. Dorius, 29 South Main Street, 
P.O. Box U, Brigham City, Utah 84032, postage pre-paid, this 
19th day of November, 1990. 
Paralegal o^vru^- ( 
